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ASPECTS AND ABSTRACTA
B. Madison Mount1
1
Philosophers of perception and psychologists first studied ‘multistable’ 
or ‘reversible’ figures, Kippbilder, in the nineteenth century. The earliest 
description of the phenomenon of a ‘sudden and involuntary change in 
the apparent position’ of a represented object occurred in a letter writ-
ten by Louis Albert Necker in Geneva to Sir David Brewster on 24 May 
1832 and published six months later in the Philosophical Magazine.2 
The picture in question would subsequently become known as the 
Necker cube (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Necker cube.
Necker’s original remark was only a passing observation; the systematic 
investigation of multistability began in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong, and their students discussed 
multistable figures as part of their general study of optical illusions.3 
The most important philosophical treatment of multistable figures, 
however, appeared in 1953 in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investiga-
tions.4 Wittgenstein’s chief example, due to the late nineteenth-century 
psychologist Joseph Jastrow, is the ‘duck-rabbit’ figure, ‘which can be 
seen as a rabbit’s head or as a duck’s’.5
 It is this ‘seeing-as’ structure that is central to Wittgenstein’s discus-
sion of the Kippbild. Seeing-as, for Wittgenstein, is not reducible to 
mere seeing:
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If I saw the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, then I saw: these shapes and colours (I 
give them in detail) – and I saw besides something like this: and here I 
point to a number of different pictures of rabbits. – This shews the differ-
ence between the concepts. ‘Seeing as …’ is not part of perception. And for 
that reason it is like seeing and again not like.6
But what it is in seeing-as that exceeds bare seeing, that does not form 
‘part of perception’ in the same manner as merely receiving impressions 
of spatial relations among parts of the visual field, is unclear. The differ-
ence seems, to a first approximation, to lie in something like cognitive 
access to a special property of the perceived object – the property, in the 
case of the duck-rabbit seen qua rabbit, of representing a rabbit, a prop-
erty rendered manifest to the perceiver by the image’s resemblance to 
other rabbit-images.7
2
This article takes its inspiration – and, to a certain extent, its form – 
from Wittgenstein’s discussion. It consists of a set of observations about 
the ‘seeing-as’ structure, followed by sketches for a tentative research 
programme for investigating it.
 Unlike Wittgenstein, however, I do not hold that the ultimate result 
of any investigation of our talk of seeing something as something must 
be ‘to accept […] the everyday language game’, if by this it is meant that 
we should abandon the attempt to describe the metaphysical structure 
of the world, the phenomenology of our mental attitudes, or the logical 
form of the propositions that lie at their interface.8 Instead, I maintain 
that there is a general theory of seeing-as ascriptions to be discovered, 
and that it has an important, unexpected consequence: the structure ‘S 
sees a as F’ generalizes beyond cases of concrete perception. There is a 
more comprehensive, unified class of intentional attitudes described by 
sentences of the form ‘S ϕ-s a as F’, where substituends for ϕ are what I 
shall term cognitive access verbs: not only verbs of concrete perception 
– ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘touch’, and the like – but verbs such as ‘think about’, 
‘cognize’, and ‘contemplate’.9 To account fully for these intentional atti-
tudes would far exceed the scope of this paper. My task here is merely 
to make a case for the existence of such attitudes by focusing on one 
particularly interesting class of examples: attitudes of contemplation of 
abstract objects under an aspect.
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 For the purposes of this paper, I assume that the general contours 
of the abstract/concrete distinction can be made clear by example. 
Tables, elementary particles, minds, a particular red sense-datum, indi-
vidual cognitive processes, space–time regions, a particular copy of 
Madame Bovary, a particular utterance of the English sentence ‘What 
time is it?’ – these are concrete. The number two, the empty set, red-
ness, the property of being a space–time region, Madame Bovary, the 
English sentence ‘What time is it?’ – these are abstract.10 Note that 
‘abstractness’, in the sense at issue here, is in no way related to any psy-
chological process: abstract objects are not concepts produced in the 
mind by ‘generalizing’ from concreta; they are not concepts at all. 
(There are such things as concepts of the number two and of Madame 
Bovary, but here we are not concerned with them; we are concerned 
instead with the number two and with Madame Bovary.) Some 
abstracta are particulars: √3, the empty set, Jacob’s Room. Some are 
universals: greenness, the property of being a triangle, and so on. The 
mathematical abstracta that we shall consider are particulars – num-
bers, sets, and so on.
 But, in addition to the abstracta discussed in mathematics and gen-
eral metaphysics, there are artefactual abstracta: objects ontologically 
dependent on human activities and thus (in some sense) temporal, but 
nonetheless causally inert and nonspatial.11 Among these are literary 
and musical works. At first, it may seem strange to speak of (some) art-
works as abstract; however, as I shall argue, this position makes the best 
sense of their properties: literary and musical works are abstract types 
of which specific copies and specific performances, respectively, are con-
crete tokens.12 We nonetheless normally gain cognitive access to these 
non-physical types through the corresponding tokens. Moreover, that 
access is usually aspect-relative.
 The structure of this article is as follows: §3 discusses multistable 
figures in general; §4 offers a few observations about concrete instances 
of seeing-as; §5 gives examples of the aspect-relative cognition of math-
ematical objects; §6 gives analogous examples for artworks; and §7 
offers a tentative conclusion and a programme for further research. An 
Appendix includes a few notes about the realist perspective towards 
mathematical and artefactual abstracta assumed in the paper. The dis-
cussions in §§5–6 and the Appendix are largely independent of each 
other; readers interested only in the mathematical or the aesthetic exam-
ples should feel free to skip the other sections, although – as I argue at 
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the end of §7 – there may be insights to be gained from considering the 
two types of cases together.
3
Nowhere in the Philosophical Investigations does Wittgenstein attempt 
to offer an analysis of what it is to be a multistable figure. This is not 
surprising, since his interest is in more general phenomena; the ultimate 
purchase of the notion lies in its connection to the theory of meaning, as 
the example of ‘aspect-blindness’ makes clear.13 Moreover, Wittgenstein 
passes quite freely between what we may term ‘strict’ visual seeing-as, 
which occurs in cases of two-dimensional multistable images, and the 
broader phenomenon that takes place, for example, when a geometrical 
figure is used in a book to illustrate various physical objects of a com-
mon shape.14 He seems to hold that these cases have a shared general 
structure, which is tied to the notion of an interpretation (‘But how is it 
possible to see an object according to an interpretation?’15), although 
the border between interpreting and seeing is not easy to draw.16
 I shall follow him in this regard: on my view, ‘I see the picture as an 
image of a duck’ not only displays the same structure as ‘I see the tin 
rectangle as a street sign’, but the same kind of intentional attitude is 
denoted by the ‘see a as F’ verb phrase in each case. Nonetheless, it is 
worthwhile to set out the core components of the paradigm cases – lit-
eral, two-dimensional visual Kippbilder. It will then be possible to 
determine to what extent these features carry over to perceptual struc-
tures – and non-perceptual cognitive structures – that are relevantly 
similar to the central cases. I propose that the following conditions are 
sufficient for something to be a multistable figure. I leave aside the 
question of whether they are necessary; at the very least, it seems that 
giving necessary conditions would require treating cases of multistable 
figures with more than two configurations. Nonetheless, these condi-
tions pick out at least one paradigmatic class of Kippbilder.
 A two-dimensional figure F is multistable if
(a)  in every standard perceptual condition, the figure represents only 
one thing;
(b)  there is at least one standard perceptual condition under which the 
figure represents something with property F (we shall call any such 
condition an F-condition);
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(c)  there is at least one standard perceptual condition under which the 
figure represents something with property G (we shall call any such 
condition a G-condition);
(d)  there is no standard perceptual condition under which the figure 
represents something with both properties F and G;
(e)  there are perceptual experiences of the figure that involve instanta-
neous or near-instantaneous change from an F-condition to a 
G-condition or vice versa; and
(f)  there are no perceptual experiences of the figure that involve a 
gradual or prolonged change from an F-condition to a G-condition 
or vice versa.
These criteria make use of the terms ‘perceptual experience’, (visual) 
‘representation’, ‘perceptual condition’, and ‘representation under a per-
ceptual condition’.
 Perceptual experiences are simply the occurrent experiences that 
one undergoes when one is perceiving; visual perceptual experiences, 
more specifically, are the occurrent experiences that one undergoes 
when one is seeing. Identity of perceptual content is necessary for iden-
tity of perceptual experiences (whether it is sufficient need not concern 
us). I shall also occasionally speak of a ‘perceptual state’: a perceiver’s 
perceptual state at time t is individuated by the totality of perceptual 
experiences that he or she is undergoing at t. (I do not take a position 
here on the issue of externalism about mental content – the question of 
whether facts about extramental entities are ineliminably involved in 
the contents of perception.)
 Although the notion of visual representation is far from unprob-
lematic, we can provisionally separate the difficulties involved in the 
question of representation from the problem of multistability. The basic 
notion, in the case of two-dimensional figures, can be made clear by 
examples: a painting of Mont St Michel represents Mont St Michel, an 
appropriately shaded coloured circle represents a sphere, and so on. (In 
the circumscribed sense of ‘represent’ at issue here, a painting of Mont 
St Michel does not represent the power of the mediaeval Church, or the 
dogma of the Assumption, or the painter’s personal attachment to Nor-
mandy, although it might evoke, convey, or allegorize these things.) 
What is crucial is that a figure can represent something with properties 
different from those of the figure itself: a drawing of the Taj Mahal rep-
resents something that is not flat, even though the drawing itself is flat. 
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Representation is fundamentally a property of objects, not of perceivers 
(although, to be sure, it is a property that objects have in virtue of their 
dispositions to induce certain perceptual experiences). More generally, 
we can speak of an object’s representing something for an observer (or 
for an observer at a time). I shall suggest in §4 that such cases are at 
least sufficient, if not necessary, for seeing-as: if a represents an F for S, 
then S sees a as F.
 A perceptual condition is a general set-up, containing a perceiver, a 
perceived object, and a set of surrounding circumstances, under which 
the object is disposed to produce particular perceptual experiences in 
the perceiver. Specifically, a system consisting of object O, environment 
S, and perceiver P is in perceptual condition K if and only if O is dis-
posed, when in the conditions specified by S, to cause P to have percep-
tual experiences of kind K.17 By ‘perceptual condition’, I mean a type of 
perceptual condition, which is correlated one-to-many to distinct triples 
of object, environment, and perceiver; for instance, a single drawing of 
the duck-rabbit image displays duck-manifesting and rabbit-manifesting 
perceptual conditions, each of which can be entered into by many dif-
ferent perceivers under different visual background circumstances.
 In the cases we shall be interested in, the perceptual experiences in 
question are experiences in which a two-dimensional figure is perceived 
to represent something; in such cases, we say that the figure represents 
something (for an observer in a set-up) under a specified perceptual 
condition. More generally, a represents an F under perceptual condition 
K just in case, whenever a forms part of a system <a, S, P> that is in 
perceptual condition K, a is disposed to represent an F for S. A percep-
tual condition is ‘standard’, in the visual case, when it involves ordinary 
light, when the observer faces the observed object directly, and so on. 
There can be many different standard perceptual conditions for one 
object: my proposal is intended to allow that there can be ways of per-
ceiving a figure that not everyone sees; a figure can be multistable even 
if some people see only one of its aspects. Perceptual conditions are 
time-relative: it is only at a particular time that a perceiver is in one per-
ceptual condition or another, and for a perceiver’s perceptual experience 
to change from an F-condition to a G-condition is simply for the per-
ceiver to be in an F-condition at some time t0 and to be in a G-condi-
tion at some time t1 > t0.
 It is clear that conditions (a)–(f) divide into two groups: (a)–(d) 
relate to representational structure; (e)–(f) relate to aspect change over 
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time. We could certainly imagine aspect-relative attitudes that do not 
occur one at a time or do not shift; the objects of these attitudes would 
not be multistable figures, but they would nonetheless be objects that 
are encountered aspect-relatively. For example, it is by no means impos-
sible to hear a musical work under different aspects simultaneously 
(although change in aspect can also occur with musical perception).
 My focus in the remainder of the paper will be solely on the struc-
tural aspects of multistability and its analogues, rather than on the phe-
nomenon of aspect shift. To the extent that my argument extends the 
notion of the literal multistable figure, it does so in a way that preserves 
the aspect-relativity of the core cases rather than their temporal struc-
ture.
 It might be objected that aspect-relativity cannot be studied inde-
pendently from aspect change. As Wittgenstein repeatedly points out, it 
is normally only through aspect change that one comes to understand 
that what one is seeing is aspect-relative at all:
I may, then, have seen the duck-rabbit simply as a picture-rabbit from the 
first. That is to say, if asked, ‘What’s that?’ or ‘What do you see here?’ I 
should have replied: ‘A picture-rabbit’. [...] I should not have answered the 
question ‘What do you see here?’ by saying: ‘Now I am seeing it as a pic-
ture-rabbit.’18
For Wittgenstein, to speak of seeing the figure now under an aspect, 
without being aware that there is another aspect under which one could 
see it, is senseless: ‘It would have made as little sense for me to say 
“Now I am seeing it as …” as to say at the sight of a knife and fork 
“Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork.”’19 We should be wary, how-
ever, of following Wittgenstein in this argument. It is certainly the case 
that our evidence of aspect-relativity generally comes through aspect 
shift; perhaps it is empirically impossible to acquire the concept of 
aspect-seeing without having experienced aspect shift. In addition, it 
may well be pragmatically infelicitous to say ‘now I am seeing it as a 
picture-rabbit’ if I do not know that it is possible to see it as a duck. But 
neither of these facts makes the statement false: I might very well be see-
ing it now as a rabbit without being in a position to say so.20
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4
Criteria (a)–(f) serve to pick out the general notion of a multistable fig-
ure, but the problem can be refined by focusing on the question of 
aspect-seeing. The most basic notion used in (a)–(d) was that of an 
object a’s representing an F under conditions K, which we explained in 
terms of a disposition to represent an F to observers forming part of 
systems under K-conditions. But it seems intuitively plausible that if a 
(visually) represents an F to S, then S sees a as an F. At the very least, it 
seems difficult to conceive of a situation in which one could assert: ‘The 
drawing represents a house to me, but I don’t see it as a house.’
 A caveat is necessary here. To be sure, one might often assert: ‘The 
drawing represents a house, but I don’t see it as a house’, but that is 
predicted by the analysis. In claiming that the drawing represents a 
house, one is (in normal contexts) claiming only that it represents a 
house under standard perceptual conceptions, which is to say that it is 
disposed to represent a house to perceivers who form part of systems 
that are themselves under standard conditions. If one is aware of this 
fact, but one is suffering perceptual disturbances, in an unusual environ-
ment, or otherwise not under standard conditions, or if the disposition 
to generate the relevant perceptions is for some reason unmanifested, 
then one will be in a position to assert: ‘The drawing represents a 
house, but I don’t see it as a house.’
 For this reason, I propose to follow Wittgenstein and take the men-
tal attitudes expressed by ‘S sees a as an F-figure’ as the basic 
explananda from which a generalized theory of aspect-relative phenom-
ena should start. But how is the structure of ‘seeing a as an F-figure’ to 
be understood? It is worthwhile to begin, as Wittgenstein does in the 
relevant chapter of the Philosophical Investigations, with a preliminary 
observation about two different intentional attitudes that both go under 
the name ‘seeing’. Wittgenstein states the point as follows:
Two uses of the word ‘see.’ The one: ‘What do you see there?’ – ‘I see this’ 
(and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: ‘I see a likeness 
between these two faces’ – let the man I tell this to be seeing the faces as 
clearly as I do myself. The importance of this is the difference of category 
between the two ‘objects’ of sight.21
The passage is not entirely clear, but on the most straightforward read-
ing, the distinction is one between an intentional attitude directed 
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towards a proposition, normally expressed by a sentence of the form ‘I 
see that p’ (where p is itself a sentence), and an intentional attitude 
directed towards a non-propositional individual object, normally 
expressed by a sentence of the form ‘I see a’ (where a is a proper name 
or definite description). We shall term attitudes of the first type (and 
their analogues for relations other than seeing) propositional attitudes; 
and those of the second, objectual attitudes. Wittgenstein slightly com-
plicates the issue by using the form ‘I see a likeness’, which might be 
taken to represent an objectual attitude toward a dyadic universal or 
individual property-instance, a ‘likeness’. However, it is more likely that 
Wittgenstein places little weight on this aspect of surface grammar, 
which is apt to mislead, as more mundane examples of the same form 
suggest: ‘I see the arrival of the train’ is most plausibly a paraphrase, 
expressing the same proposition as ‘I see that the train arrives’, rather 
than a objectual-attitude ascription parallel to ‘I see the postman’. 
Objectual attitudes have been neglected in the philosophy of mind; 
indeed, it is often simply assumed that objectual attitudes are reducible 
to propositional attitudes.22 However, as Michelle Montague has 
pointed out in an incisive article, this assumption is quite unwar-
ranted.23
 How do we get from ‘S sees a’ to ‘S sees a as F’? In order to have a 
concrete example, let us use the labelled Necker cube in Tractatus 
5.5423 (Fig. 2). It is clear that my perceptual state when I see the four A 
vertices in the foreground differs from my perceptual state when I see 
the B vertices in the foreground; call the former state A and the latter B. 
In each case, one component of being in the relevant perceptual state is 
having a specific objectual attitude: whether I am in state A or state B, I 
undoubtedly see something, not just that the world is thus and so. I see 
the drawing; I do not merely see that the drawing is arranged in a par-
ticular fashion. In state A, we wish to say that I see the drawing as hav-
ing its A vertices facing forward; in state B, we wish to say that I see the 
drawing as having its B vertices facing forward.
Fig. 2. Labelled Necker Cube.
83
le so und so zu einander verhalten. in such and such a way. one another in such and such a way.
Dies erklärt wohl auch, dass man die This perhaps explains that the figure This no doubt also explains why there
Figur are two possible ways of seeing the figure
a
a a
a
b
b b
b
a
a a
a
b
b b
b
a
a a
a
b
b b
b
auf zweierlei Art als Würfel sehen kann; can be seen in two ways as a cube; and as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For
und alle ähnlichen Erscheinungen. Denn all similar phenomena. For we really see we really see two different facts.
wir sehen eben wirklich zwei verschiede- two different facts.
ne Tatsachen.
(Sehe ich erst auf die Ecken a und nur (If I fix my eyes first on the corners a (If I look in the first place at the cor-
flüchtig auf b, so erscheint a vorne; und and only glance at b, a appears in front ners marked a and only glance at the b’s,
umgekehrt.) and b behind, and vice versa.) then the a’s appear to be in front, and vice
versa).
5.55 Wir müssen nun die Frage nach allen We must now answer a priori the ques- We now have to answer a priori the
möglichen Formen der Elementarsätze a tion as to all possible forms of the elemen- question about all the possible forms of
priori beantworten. tary propositions. elementary propositions.
Der Elementarsatz besteht aus Na- The elementary proposition consists Elementary propositions consist of
men. Da wir aber die Anzahl der Namen of names. Since we cannot give the num- names. Since, however, we are unable to
von verschiedener Bedeutung nicht ange- ber of names with different meanings, we give the number of names with different
ben können, so können wir auch nicht die cannot give the composition of the elemen- meanings, we are also unable to give the
Zusammensetzung des Elementarsatzes tary proposition. composition of elementary propositions.
angeben.
5.551 Unser Grundsatz ist, dass jede Fra- Our fundamental principle is that ev- Our fundamental principle is that
ge, die sich überhaupt durch die Logik ery question which can be decided at all whenever a question can be decided by
entscheiden läßt, sich ohne weiteres ent- by logic can be decided without further logic at all it must be possible to decide it
scheiden lassen muss. trouble. without more ado.
(Und wenn wir in die Lage kommen, (And if we get into a situation where (And if we get into a position where
ein solches Problem durch Ansehen der we need to answer such a problem by look- we have to look at the world for an answer
Welt beantworten zu müssen, so zeigt ing at the world, this shows that we are to such a problem, that shows that we are
dies, dass wir auf grundfalscher Fährte on a fundamentally wrong track.) on a completely wrong track.)
sind.)
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How are we to interpret this? It is natural to start by attempting a 
reductive analysis: a biconditional of the form ‘S sees a as F if and only 
if …’ where the problematic ‘as’ formulation does not appear on the 
right-hand side. One simple reduction suggests itself: perhaps to have a 
seeing-as attitude is simply to have both an objectual attitude and a 
related propositional attitude. More specifically, perhaps S sees a as F at 
time t if and only if S sees a at time t and S sees at time t that a is F. So, 
for example, my being in perceptual state A would amount to my seeing 
the drawing as A-foregrounded, and my seeing the drawing as A-fore-
grounded would amount to the conjunction of my (objectually) seeing 
the drawing and my (propositionally) seeing that it is A-foregrounded. 
(Here the relevant sense of ‘see that’ will have to be non-factive, by 
analogy to the non-veridical objectual sense of ‘see’ that allows for error 
and illusion.)
 This reductive analysis, however, is unsuccessful. The conjunction 
of seeing a and seeing that a is F may be necessary for seeing a as F, but 
it is not sufficient. In seeing the drawing, I also see that it is composed 
of lines less than a millimetre wide, but I do not see it as composed of 
small lines in the same way in which, at any particular time, I see it as 
A-vertex-foregrounded or as B-vertex-foregrounded. My perception of 
the thickness of the lines that make up the figure does not enter – even 
when I am directly, occurrently aware of it – into the content of my vis-
ual experience in the same way as my perception of the figure’s appar-
ent orientation. The orientation of the figure as to foreground and 
background plays a fundamental role in determining the kind of thing 
that I take the figure to represent; line width, in contrast, is incidental.
 This counterexample refutes only the simplest reduction of ‘S sees a 
as F’. I am not prepared to say that no analysis can succeed, although I 
think the prospects are poor. I think it is more fruitful, however, to take 
‘S sees a as F’ on its own terms – at least provisionally – rather than to 
expect any reduction that would eliminate the ‘as’ component. This 
does not resolve all questions about its logical form; we might ask, for 
instance, whether ‘as F’ is an adverbial modification (and thus, on the 
standard analysis, denotes a property of events of seeing)24 or part of a 
compound singular term ‘a as F’.25 The crucial consideration, however, 
is the following: to see a as F implies, but is not implied by, seeing a and 
seeing (at least in the non-factive sense of ‘see’) that a is F.
 Over and above these components, there is, at least in most cases, 
an additional element involved – a kind of relevance of F-ness to the 
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sort of thing that a is taken to be. This is the roughest of characteriza-
tions, but it will suffice to motivate the search for non-perceptual ana-
logues falling under the form ‘S ϕ-s a as F’.
5
My first mathematical example comes from group theory. It seems intu-
itively compelling that I can simply think about, for instance, the set {1, 
2} and, in thinking about it, have access to it as an object of reflection, 
independently of any beliefs that I may be forming about it. It may be, 
as a matter of practical fact, impossible for me to think about {1, 2} 
without also thinking certain propositions about it – for example, the 
proposition that it has two members. Yet the two are distinct acts. In 
other words, there are objectual attitudes of contemplation of mathe-
matical objects as well as propositional attitudes. But are there contem-
plating-as attitudes – aspect-relative attitudes that are linked with, but 
not reducible to, objectual and propositional attitudes?
  Let us consider a somewhat more complicated example – the set G 
consisting of the three cube roots of unity: G = {1, –½(1+i√3), –½(1–
i√3)}. I can conceive of the elements of G simply as complex numbers, 
or of G itself as one of the elements of the power set of the complex 
numbers. But I can also think of G as the underlying set of the structure 
Γ = <G, · >, where ‘·’ denotes ordinary multiplication of complex num-
bers; in so doing, I attend to the algebraic properties of the elements of 
G under that operation. Γ is a cyclic group of order three – that is to 
say, an algebraic structure consisting of a three-element set {a, b, c} and 
an associated binary operation, ∘, which obeys a specific transforma-
tion table (Fig. 3). (It is easy to verify both that Γ does obey this trans-
formation table, and that any algebraic structure obeying this transfor-
mation table is in fact a group.26) Because every structure that is a cyclic 
group of order three is isomorphic to every other such structure, it is 
customary to speak simply of the cyclic group of order three, Z3. The 
axioms of group theory are among the simplest examples in mathemat-
ics of formal rather than assertory axioms: they do not state that any-
thing exists; they merely set conditions for something to be a structure 
of a certain kind, and for convenience, when doing group theory, we 
ignore those features of cyclic-group-of-order-three-structured objects 
that are not given in the transformation table (in other words, we treat 
them as equivalent ‘up to isomorphism’).27 So G under the operation of 
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complex multiplication, the set {0, 1, 2} under the operation of addition 
modulo 3, and the set of rotations in a plane {0°, 120°, 240°} under the 
operation of composition are all instances of the structure for which the 
term ‘Z3’ goes proxy. 
Fig. 3. Transformation Table for Z3.
(Should we consider these various mathematical structures as tokens of 
the Z3-type? This is a difficult question, which we need not answer 
here. First, because group-theoretical axioms are not assertory, it is 
unclear that we should take existential commitment to such a thing as 
‘the’ Z3 group at face value. To do so is not required by our interpreta-
tion of the intentional state: in ‘S ϕ-s a as F’, ‘F’ stands in predicate, not 
in singular term, position, and even if the relevant logical form were ‘S 
ϕ-s a as the F’, there would be no need to assume that the truth of such 
a statement entails the existence of a unique F such that S ϕ-s a as it. 
Secondly, the token/type relationship is paradigmatically a relation of 
concreta to abstracta. Here, however, structures such as Γ are abstract, 
and ‘the cyclic group of order three’ denotes an abstract object, if it 
denotes at all, so any token/type relationship would be one of abstracta 
to other abstracta.)
 However, being a cyclic group of order three is not just any mathe-
matical property. It is a property sufficiently important and natural to 
mark out a particular kind of cognitive access to mathematical objects; 
it is, in other words, a property that can give rise to a possible mode of 
cognition under an aspect. To think about G as the base set of a Z3 
group is not the same thing as thinking about it as a subset of the com-
plex numbers; the first is a natural way to think about the set when 
doing group theory, the second, perhaps, a way one might approach it 
in complex analysis. Nor is it sufficient, in order to think about G 
under its Z3 aspect, to think about G and to believe that it is the base 
set of a cyclic group of order three; one might well know this whilst 
thinking of G in another way entirely. Thus, it seems that thinking 
about G as the base set of a Z3 group is an example of a cognitive atti-
tude that has an irreducible ‘as’-structure analogous to that involved in 
∘ a b c
a a b c
b b c a
c c a b
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cases of ‘seeing-as’. Much as seeing the Necker cube as forward-facing 
is something over and above seeing it, and seeing that it is forward-fac-
ing, thinking about G as the base set of a Z3 group – thinking about it 
in the way in which one thinks about it when one considers it as a 
group-theoretical object – is something more than merely thinking 
about it and thinking that it is the base set of a Z3 group.
 My second example derives from a famous thought experiment 
offered by Paul Benacerraf in his essay ‘What Numbers Could Not Be’. 
Imagine two children, Ernie and Johnny, who were taught mathematics 
starting from standard set theory (in other words, the Zermelo-Fraenkel 
axioms and the axiom of choice). Each was then taught arithmetic in 
terms of the set theory that he already knew; each was taught that there 
was a set of natural numbers, whose members were sets he was already 
familiar with, and each was told how to define certain operations on 
those sets – the operations called addition, multiplication, and so on. 
Having learned to use the vernacular – to call the first natural number 
‘zero’ and the second ‘one’, as abbreviations for their proper names – 
they could then go on to talk about arithmetic to each other (and to the 
rest of us, who learned arithmetic the ordinary way). We shall allow 
Benacerraf to tell the rest of the story:
Delighted with what they had learned, they started proving theorems 
about numbers. Comparing notes, they soon became aware that something 
was wrong, for a dispute immediately ensued about whether or not 3 
belonged to 17. Ernie said that it did, Johnny that it did not. Attempts to 
settle this by asking ordinary folk (who had been dealing with numbers as 
numbers for a long time) understandably brought only blank stares. In 
support of his view, Ernie pointed to his theorem that for any two num-
bers, x and y, x is less than y if and only if x belongs to y and x is a proper 
subset of y. Since by common admission 3 is less than 17 it followed that 3 
belonged to 17. Johnny, on the other hand, countered that Ernie’s ‘theo-
rem’ was mistaken, for given two numbers, x and y, x belongs to y if and 
only if y is the successor of x. These were clearly incompatible ‘theorems.’ 
Excluding the possibility of the inconsistency of their common set theory, 
the incompatibility must reside in the definitions.28
The incompatibility lay, it turned out, in the fact that Johnny and Ernie 
had learned different set-theoretical definitions of the numbers. Johnny 
had learned that the numbers were the Zermelo ordinals,
 0 = Ø, 1 = {Ø}, 2 = {{Ø}}, 3 = {{{Ø}}} …,
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(where ‘Ø’ denotes the empty set), but Ernie had learned that the num-
bers were the von Neumann ordinals,
 0 = Ø, 1 = {Ø}, 2 = {Ø, {Ø}}, 3 = {Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}} ….
Who is right? There is no arithmetical difference between the two sys-
tems; each one proves the same theorems of arithmetic. Both Ernie and 
Johnny can prove, for instance, that there are five primes between 10 
and 24 or that a × (b + c) = (a × b) + (a × c). (The statement that started 
the controversy, ‘3 ∈ 17’, is a statement of set theory, not of arithmetic.) 
And it seems that only arithmetical properties should count for deciding 
between Ernie and Johnny; we might have reasons of convenience or 
caprice for preferring one account or the other for some purpose, but 
these reasons cannot be grounds for thinking one right and the other 
wrong. Thus, both are right or neither is; and obviously both cannot be 
right, for if 2 = {{Ø}} and 2 = {Ø, {Ø}}, then {{Ø}} = {Ø, {Ø}}, and that is 
certainly not the case. But if both Johnny and Ernie are wrong, deeply 
wrong, about the fundamental question of what it is to be a number, 
then why do both of them seem to do arithmetic perfectly well?
 Benacerraf suggests, tentatively, that the lesson is that numbers are 
not objects. I suggest that, instead, we should conclude that numbers 
are not sets – they are rather sui generis objects. Their properties are not 
reducible to those found in the Peano axioms; what it is to be a natural 
number is also determined, in part, through the role natural numbers 
play as finite cardinals.29 But then how is it that Johnny and Ernie could 
talk about numbers using sets, if numbers are not sets? Here the notion 
of a proxy-structure is essential: it is characteristic of any series isomor-
phic to the natural numbers – in technical terms, any ω-sequence – that 
it can go proxy for the numbers. My thesis is that one can learn to think 
about the natural numbers by thinking of the elements of a proxy-struc-
ture under an appropriate aspect. (This should not be surprising: most 
of us were introduced to the numbers through a particular proxy-series: 
the numerals.30) In learning to use {{Ø}} as 2, Johnny did not merely 
learn isolated mathematical facts; he learned to use a particular series as 
a proxy-structure and thereby learned to conceive of {{Ø}} under the 
2-aspect, rather than simply as a particular pure set. Likewise, Ernie 
learned to conceive of {Ø,{Ø}} under the 2-aspect. In so doing, however, 
they gained indirect knowledge of 2 itself – they learned, at the very 
least, what kind of thing 2 is – through an aspect-relative cognition that 
goes deeper than a merely functional determination.
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6
My examples of aspect-relative contemplation of artefactual abstracta 
involve literary works. The first work is a poem from Cent mille milli-
ards de poèmes (A Hundred Million Million Poems) by Raymond Que-
neau. Queneau, along with the mathematician François Le Lionnais, 
founded the experimental literary group OULIPO (Ouvroir de Littéra-
ture Potentielle) devoted to the study and production of constrained 
writing. The poem is an elegantly constructed, if somewhat irreverent, 
sonnet:
Du jeune avantageux la nymphe était éprise
snob un peu sur les bords des bords fondamentaux
une toge il portait qui n’était pas de mise
des narcisses on cueille ou bien on est de veaux
Quand on prend des photos de cette tour de Pise
d’où Galilée jadis jeta ses petits pots
d’une étrusque inscription la pierre était incise
les Grecs et les Romains en vain cherchent leurs mots
L’esprit souffle et resouffle au dessus de la botte
le touriste à Florence ignoble charibotte
l’autocar écrabouille un peu d’esprit latin
Les rapports transalpins sont-ils biunivoques?
les banquiers d’Avignon changent-ils les baïoques?
le Beaune et le Chianti sont-ils le même vin?31
The text occupies a single page in the collected edition of Queneau’s 
poetry, with horizontal rules separating the lines; it is the sixth of ten 
sonnets thus presented. Each of the ten printed sonnets follows an 
ababababccdeed rhyme scheme, and each line in each sonnet rhymes 
with the corresponding line in every other sonnet. More impressively, 
each line in each sonnet is also syntactically isomorphic to the corre-
sponding line in every other sonnet. Thus, by simple permutation, there 
are 1014 possible sonnets that can be generated from the ten-poem 
matrix; in the original edition, instead of horizontal rules there are cuts 
in the paper between the individual lines, and the permutation can be 
accomplished by hand.
 These fourteen lines – by which I mean the fourteen lines as a 
poem-type, not any particular instance of them, whether printed in a 
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copy of the original incised edition or the collected works, or reprinted 
in this article, or even read aloud – are thus simultaneously constituents 
of two distinct artworks: the ten-sonnet matrix sequence, tokens of 
which are printed under the title Cent mille milliards de poèmes, and 
the physically unprintable 1014 poem sonnet sequence comprising all the 
permissible combinations of the 140 lines making up the matrix son-
nets. Let us call the former work C1 and the latter work C2. There are 
two corresponding aspects under which one can understand the individ-
ual sonnet: let us call them D1 and D2. It is essential to understanding 
‘Du jeune avantageux la nymphe était éprise’ that one be able to see it 
under these two different aspects. The aesthetic properties of the son-
net-under-aspect-D1 and the sonnet-under-aspect-D2 differ. For exam-
ple, since Queneau composed C1 directly and C2 only indirectly, the link 
between the stylistic features of the sonnet-under-D1 and those of Que-
neau’s other compositions is far more direct than is the case for the son-
net-under-D2.
 Something similar is involved in homophonic translations – texts 
written, more or less grammatically, using words of one language cho-
sen on the basis of their phonetic similarity to the words in a (usually 
famous) text in a different language. Queneau and the OULIPO group 
were also interested in homophonic translation; the second OULIPO 
manifesto, for instance, includes François Le Lionnais’s version of the 
opening line of Keats’s Endymion, uttered before the monkey cage at 
the Jardin des Plantes: ‘Un singe de beauté est un jouet pour l’hiver.’32 
My example, however, comes from Mots d’heures, gousses, rames: The 
D’Antin Manuscript, an elaborate piece of mock-scholarship published 
in 1967 by the actor Luis D’Antin van Rooten. The volume purports to 
be an edition of an anonymous eighteenth-century manuscript; in the 
preface, we are informed that the poems ‘assume a strangely familiar, 
almost nostalgic, homely quality’33 when read aloud. To an Anglophone 
reader, they are indeed familiar, for Mother Goose hides behind Mots 
d’heures, gousses, and the refrain of Humpty Dumpty is to be found in 
the following lines:
Un petit d’un petit
S’étonne aux Halles
Un petit d’un petit
Ah! degrés te fallent
Indolent qui ne sort cesse
Indolent qui ne se mène
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Qu’importe un petit d’un petit
Tout Gai de Reguennes.34
But an exclusively Anglophone reader will miss the best part of the 
joke, for Mots d’heures purports to be an annotated edition. The 
extraordinarily convoluted glosses in the footnotes result from the con-
straint of taking the French, as French, seriously: ‘un petit d’un petit’, 
we are informed, is ‘[t]he inevitable result of child marriage’, while 
obviously anyone who would ‘s’étonne aux Halles’ must be a visitor 
from the provinces. The rustic hero will not end well, however, as is 
shown by the comparison with Gai de Reguennes, ‘a young squire […] 
who died at the tender age of twelve of a surfeit of Saracen arrows 
before the walls of Acre in 1191’.35
 Here the aspect-relativity in question is relativity to a particular 
language: the same base text is interpretable as French and as English 
(or some near approximations to those languages), and its proper 
understanding requires that both aspects be available to cognition. In 
this case, there is an interesting disanalogy with literal multistable fig-
ures: it seems possible, at least after the first reading, to think about 
both the poem-under-the-English-aspect and the poem-under-the-
French-aspect simultaneously.
7
These four examples, as I noted in §2, are intended only to motivate the 
claim that there can be aspect-relative cognition of abstracta, not to 
develop the consequences of that thesis. Nonetheless, it is worth at least 
adverting to one reason that the existence of such phenomena is impor-
tant. Where the abstracta in question are mathematical objects, the 
structural kinship between seeing-as and contemplating-as or cognizing-
as helps to account for the intuition, famously expressed by Kurt Gödel, 
that we have ‘something like a perception’ of at least some mathemati-
cal objects.36
 Explaining this intuition is important for realists about mathemati-
cal objects. A common objection raised by nominalists against mathe-
matical realists is that realism requires mysterious causal connections 
between abstract entities and minds in order for us to have knowledge 
of the truth of mathematical statements.37 As a general anti-realist argu-
ment, this objection rests on causal requirements for knowledge that are 
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independently implausible.38 But it might be thought to retain some 
force with respect to objectual cognitive attitudes, such as contempla-
tion of the set G. Gödelian intuitions suggest that, if such attitudes 
exist, they are perception-like. Causal linkage may not be required for 
all knowledge, but it certainly is required for literal perception. If the 
only way for a cognitive attitude to be perception-like is for it to be 
grounded in a causal connection with its object akin to that involved in 
literal perception, and there are no causal connections between minds 
and abstracta, then we must reject Gödelian intuitions about our objec-
tual attitudes to mathematical objects: either we do not genuinely have 
such attitudes, or they are not perception-like. Realists will not find this 
an appealing option, however, for the Gödelian thesis is prima facie 
quite plausible. But if a cognitive attitude’s perception-like character can 
be explained through its potentially being subject to aspect-relativity, 
rather than through any causal link between mind and object, then we 
can maintain the Gödelian thesis without attributing mysterious causal 
powers to mathematical abstracta.
 The importance of the aesthetic cases is less novel; outside the phi-
losophy of perception, the ‘seeing-as’ structure has been most fully stud-
ied in aesthetics (although usually with concrete artworks as exam-
ples).39 However, the connection between the occurrence of this struc-
ture in thought about artworks and its occurrence in thought about 
mathematicalia does point toward a number of new issues. To some 
degree, it may furnish an indirect argument against nominalism: to the 
extent that nominalists find mathematical cognition mysterious, they 
should also find ordinary aesthetic contemplation mysterious, since that 
contemplation has the same sort of non-causal intentional structure; but 
if the problems involved in explaining this structure afford us little rea-
son to doubt the existence of symphonies and novels, they should also 
pose no epistemological threat to belief in numbers and sets.
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A P P E N D I X :  S O M E  V A R I E T I E S  O F  R E A L I S M  A N D  N O M I N A L I S M
My mathematical examples, involving sets and numbers, will of course 
be rejected by those who reject the existence of sets and numbers. In 
general, for some domain of objects X, those who deny that Xs exist are 
called nominalists about Xs; those who accept that Xs exist, realists 
about Xs. I do not propose to give an extended defence of my version of 
realism – or, as it is often called, platonism – about mathematical 
objects.40 However, because mathematical platonism is sometimes con-
sidered very implausible, it is worth giving a brief example of the sort of 
considerations that can be marshalled in support of it.41 The simplest 
argument can be summed up in a sentence: ‘There are four prime num-
bers less than ten; therefore, there are numbers.’ And numbers are as 
uncontroversially abstract as can be imagined; they are abstract if any-
thing is. Therefore, abstract objects exist. How would the nominalist 
respond to this argument? To deny that there are four prime numbers 
less than ten is absurd. Thus the nominalist must challenge the inference 
from ‘there are four prime numbers less than ten’ to ‘there are num-
bers’. But the following inference, of the same apparent form, seems 
obviously valid: ‘There are four lions in Berlin zoos; therefore, there are 
lions.’ To reject the inference in the mathematical case and accept it in 
the leonine one requires that the meaning of ‘there are’ in the premise of 
the argument about numbers must be different from that of ‘there are’ 
in its conclusion, and, moreover, that it must be different in a way that 
is not the case in the corresponding statements about ordinary objects. 
The nominalist, in short, requires that mathematical quantifier expres-
sions, such as ‘there are’ and ‘there exist’, be ambiguous in a way that 
other quantifier expressions are not. Yet the fact that we can pass seam-
lessly from mathematical to non-mathematical statements by rules of 
inference demonstrates that this is not the case; for instance, we can 
infer from ‘there are four prime numbers less than ten’ and ‘there are 
four lions in Berlin zoos’ to ‘there are as many lions in Berlin zoos as 
prime numbers less than ten’; this would not be the case were mathe-
matical quantification semantically deviant. Mathematical language is 
not an esoteric code, but rather a part of our common language, gov-
erned by the same general principles as the rest; we should take its 
claims at face value.42
 With respect to artefactual abstracta, the argumentative stakes are 
reversed. Many people doubt that numbers exist, but few will deny that 
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numbers, if they exist, are abstracta. All will concede that Bleak House 
exists, but many will doubt that it is abstract, or conceding its abstract-
ness, will doubt that it is artefactual. Here again I shall only give some 
rough arguments for motivation. Bleak House is not identical to any 
particular copy of it, for any particular copy – even the author’s auto-
graph manuscript – could be destroyed without damaging Bleak House 
itself in the least. Bleak House is surely linked to some of Charles Dick-
ens’s thoughts, but it is not itself and never was a thought in Dickens’s 
mind: I have read Bleak House, but I cannot read minds. Is Bleak 
House the sum of all its individual copies – that is to say, is it the con-
crete whole that has them as its parts? Surely not: it might well be true 
that the concrete whole made up of all the copies of Bleak House in the 
world weighs two tonnes, but Bleak House itself does not weigh any-
thing. Is it the set of all the individual copies? If so, it would presumably 
be abstract, because sets are abstract; but in any case, it is not. It is 
essential to a set that it have as members those things that it in fact has: 
it is not possible for the set {1, 3, 7} to have any members other than the 
numbers one, three, and seven. But clearly there could have been more 
or fewer copies of Bleak House than there in fact are. The best answer, 
in the face of all these objections, is the answer that we have been giving 
all along: Bleak House is a type, its individual copies tokens.
 Bleak House, the type, is composed of sentence-types; nonetheless, 
it cannot simply be equated with the sequence of sentence types that 
composes it. Some causal facts about its composition are essential to it. 
This lesson is familiar to anyone who knows Borges’s ‘Pierre Menard, 
Author of the Quixote’:
He did not want to compose another Don Quixote – which would be easy 
– but the Don Quixote. It is unnecessary to add that his aim was never to 
produce a mechanical transcription of the original; he did not propose to 
copy it. His admirable ambition was to produce pages which would coin-
cide – word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cer-
vantes. […] The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are verbally identi-
cal, but the second is almost infinitely richer.43
Of course, Pierre Menard is himself fictional, and his Quixote does not 
really exist. Yet it would not do to reject the insight because of that. 
The story is, among other things, a thought experiment, and thought 
experiments are real sources of knowledge. (Needless to say, Borges’s 
great text is not merely a thought experiment.) If every literary work 
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were identical to the sequence of sentences that composed it, then Pierre 
Menard’s Quixote and Cervantes’s Quixote would be identical, for each 
is comprised of the same sequence of sentences. But they are not. More-
over, it is wholly implausible that one of the two should be identical to 
the sequence of sentences that composes it, or more generally that some 
literary works should be identical to the sentences of which they are 
comprised and others not. Thus, we should say that no literary work is 
just a sequence of sentences, although every work is constituted from a 
sequence of sentences. An analogous argument applies to musical 
works: as Jerrold Levinson points out, ‘[a] work identical in sound 
structure with Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire (1912) but composed by 
Richard Strauss in 1897 would be aesthetically different from Schoen-
berg’s work.’44 Sound structure alone does not make a musical work, 
just as verbal sequence alone does not make a literary work.
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13 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 214d; Werkausgabe, I, p. 553.
14 See the example of the cube at Philosophical Investigations, p. 193h; Werkaus-
gabe, I, p. 519. Note that this cube is not a Necker cube, as it is mistakenly rep-
resented in earlier printings of Anscombe’s edition of the text.
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 200e; Werkausgabe, I, p. 519: ‘Wie 
ist es aber möglich, daß man ein Ding einer Deutung gemäß sieht?’
16 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 212d; Werkausgabe, I, p. 550.
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18 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 194f–195a; Werkausgabe, I, p. 
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nicht geantwortet: “Ich sehe das jetzt als Bildhasen.”’
19 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 195c; Werkausgabe, I, p. 521: ‘Zu 
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dox; see Philosophical Investigations, part II, subpart i, pp. 190–92; Werkaus-
gabe, I, pp. 513–17. The general point that truth conditions can diverge from 
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losophy of language: see generally Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). See also Saul Kripke’s criti-
cism of Wittgenstein’s discussion of the standard metre (Wittgenstein, Philosoph-
ical Investigations, §50; Werkausgabe, I, p. 268) in Naming and Necessity (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 55. 
21 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 193a; Werkausgabe, I, p. 518: 
‘Zwei Verwendungen des Wortes “sehen”. Die eine: “Was siehst du dort?” – 
“Ich sehe dies” (es folgt eine Beschreibung, eine Zeichnung, eine Kopie). Die 
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Der kategorische Unterschied der beiden “Objekte” des Sehens.’
22 For an attempted treatment of seeing-as based solely on propositional attitudes, 
see Robert Howell, ‘Seeing As’, Synthese, 23 (1972), pp. 400–22.
23 Michelle Montague, ‘Against Propositionalism’, Noûs, 41 (2007), pp. 503–18.
24 See Donald Davidson, ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, in The Logic of 
Decision and Action, ed. by Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1967), pp. 81–95, rpt. with afterword in Davidson’s Essays on 
Actions and Events, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 105–48.
25 One might argue that the objects of seeing-as are qua objects, such as ‘a-qua-F’ 
in a sense similar to that developed in Kit Fine, ‘Acts, Events, and Things’, in 
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Symposiums, ed. by Werner Leinfellner, Eric Kramer, and Jeffrey Schank 
(Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1982), pp. 97–105. For more general issues 
concerning the ‘as’ structure, see Allan Bäck, On Reduplication: Logical Theo-
ries of Qualification (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
26 The group axioms are as follows: (1) for all x and y ∈ S, x ∘ y ∈ S; (2) for all x, y, 
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y ∘ x = e. These axioms are termed, respectively, closure, associativity, the identity 
element axiom, and the inverse element axiom.
27 On the difference between assertory and formal axioms, see Geoffrey Hellman, 
‘Category Theory and Mathematical Structuralism’, Philosophia Mathematica, 
3rd ser., 11 (2003), pp. 129–57 (pp. 134–35).
28 Paul Benacerraf, ‘What Numbers Could Not Be’, Philosophical Review, 74 
(1965), pp. 47–73 (p. 54). 
29 Here the fundamental principle is that which it is now customary to call Hume’s 
Principle: the number of Xs = the number of Ys if and only if the Xs can be put 
into one-to-one correspondence with the Ys. It was Frege who emphasized the 
importance of the principle. One of his great accomplishments was to show that, 
given Hume’s Principle and second-order logic, one can derive the Peano axioms 
for the finite numbers. This result is now known as Frege’s Theorem; the neo-
Fregean programme in philosophy of mathematics starts from it. See Crispin 
Wright, Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Univer-
sity Press, 1983), and the essays in George Boolos, Logic, Logic, and Logic, ed. 
by John Burgess and Richard Jeffrey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999), pp. 135–341, and in Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. by William 
Demopoulos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
30 See David Auerbach, ‘Saying It with Numerals’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal 
Logic, 35 (1994), pp. 130–46; Leon Horsten, ‘Canonical Naming Systems’, 
Minds and Machines, 15 (2005), pp. 229–57; Diane Ackerman, ‘De Re Proposi-
tional Attitudes toward Integers’, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 9 (1978), 
pp. 145–53; and the discussions in David Kaplan, ‘Quantifying In’, in Words 
and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. by Donald Davidson 
and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), pp. 178–214, rpt. in Reference 
and Modality, ed. by Leonard Linsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
pp. 112–44 (particularly pp. 128–30), and Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Refer-
ence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), p. 98.
31 Raymond Queneau, ‘Cent mille milliards de poèmes’, in Œuvres complètes, ed. 
by Claude Debon, 3 vols to date (Paris: Gallimard, 1989–), I, pp. 331–47 (p. 
339); for the original, see Cent mille milliards de poèmes (Paris: Gallimard, 
1961). 
32 François Le Lionnais, ‘Le Second Manifeste’, in OULIPO, La Littérature potenti-
elle: Créations, re-créations, récréations (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), pp. 19–23 (p. 
23).
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33 Luis d’Antin van Rooten, Mots d’heures, gousses, rames: The D’Antin Manu-
script (London: Penguin, 1980), n.p.
34 Ibid, p. 1. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Kurt Gödel, ‘What Is Cantor’s Continuum Problem?’ (second version), in Philos-
ophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, ed. by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Put-
nam (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 258–73 (p. 271), rpt. in 
Collected Works, ed. by Solomon Feferman et al., 5 vols (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1990–2003), II, pp. 245–70 (pp. 267–68): ‘But, despite their 
remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a perception also 
of the objects of set theory, as seen from the fact that the axioms force them-
selves upon us as being true.’ For an attempt, quite different from the one devel-
oped here, to work out the consequences of this idea, see Penelope Maddy, Real-
ism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 36–80.
37 See Paul Benacerraf, ‘Mathematical Truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 
pp. 661–79 (pp. 671–73); for subtler forms of the argument, see Hartry Field, 
Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
38 See Mark Steiner, ‘Platonism and the Causal Theory of Knowledge’, Journal of 
Philosophy, 70 (1973), pp. 57–66.
39 In addition to Wollheim’s work cited in fn. 4, see Virgil C. Aldrich, ‘Visual Meta-
phor’, Journal of Aesthetic Education, 2 (1968), pp. 73–86; E. H. Gombrich, Art 
and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 3rd edn 
(London: Phaidon, 1968), pp. 84–89; and William G. Lycan, ‘Gombrich, Witt-
genstein, and the Duck-Rabbit’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 30 
(1971), pp. 229–37.
40 I write ‘platonism’ in lower case for the modern doctrine, ‘Platonism’ with a cap-
ital letter for that held by the historical Plato and his followers.
41 For a much fuller discussion, see Burgess and Rosen, A Subject with No Object 
(cited in fn. 10).
42 The central idea behind this argument goes back to Frege’s 1884 Foundations of 
Arithmetic; for a more direct source, see Benacerraf, ‘Mathematical Truth’, pp. 
668–70.
43 Jorge Luis Borges, Ficciones, trans. by Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove 
Press, 1962), pp. 48–49, 52. For the original, see Obras completas, 4 vols (Bue-
nos Aires: Emecé, 1989–96), I, pp. 446, 449: ‘No quería componer otro Quijote 
– lo cual es fácil – sino el Quijote. Inútil agregar que no encaró nunca una tran-
scripción mecánica del original; no se proponía copiarlo. Su admirable ambición 
era producir unas páginas que coincidieran palabra por palabra y línea por línea 
con las de Miguel de Cervantes […] El texto de Cervantes y el de Menard son 
verbalmente idénticos, pero el segundo es casi infinitamente más rico.’
44 Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’, in Music, Art, and Metaphysics (cited 
above fn. 11), p. 70.
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